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THE POLICEMAN'S RIGHT TO FREE SPEECH:
MULLER v. CONLISK
In the case of M4uller v. Conlisk' the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit was confronted with the question of the
extent to which a municipal police department may restrict the exercise
of free speech by its members. Jack Muller, a Chicago Police detective,
criticized the department's Internal Inspection Division,2 responsible
for investigating police misconduct, by stating to a television news
reporter that "[t]he IID is like a great big washing machine. Everything
they put into it comes out clean."'
The department's Disciplinary Board decided that Muller had
violated Department Rule 31' which prohibitied policemen from
'[e]ngaging in any activity, conversation, deliberation, or discussion
which is derogatory to the Department or any member or policy of the
Department."' The Board, therefore, ordered a written reprimand placed
in Muller's service record.6
Muller's suit in federal district court for a declaratory judgment
and injunctive relief was dismissed on the grounds that the reprimand
did not constitute sufficient harm to grant the plaintiff standing.' The
court of appeals reversed, holding that standing did not depend upon
the reprimand but rather upon the Rule itself, which sufficiently re-
stricted plaintiff's constitutionally protected right to freedom of speech
so as to confer standing.' The court went on to hold Rule 31 uncon-
stitutional on its face because it was overbroad, proscribing protected
areas of speech.'
A brief recitation of the history of free speech restrictions in the
realm of public employment adds insight into the Muller decision. In
1892 Oliver Wendell Holmes articulated the "no right to public employ-
1. 429 F.2d 901 (7th Cir. 1970) [hereinafter cited as Muller].
2. Hereinafter referred to as IID. Once before Muller had reported misconduct to
the IID and received what he felt to be unsatisfactory results. Id. at 902.
3. Id.
4. Muller was twice summoned to receive an oral reprimand but had refused and
demanded the hearing. Id.
5. Id.
6. The reprimand would be reviewed in connection with promotions and could
limit plaintiff's advancement. Id.
7. It is unclear whether the district court dismissed because plaintiff lacked
standing or because the controversy was not yet ripe for adjudication. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 903-04.
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ment" doctrine in McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford.1 'McAuliffe,
a policeman, was discharged because he solicited contributions for a
political purpose contrary to police regulations. Mr. Justice Holmes
upheld the 'Mayor's decision to discharge, stating that "[t]he petitioner
may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no con-
stitutional right to be a policeman."'"
As demonstrated by Adler v. Board of Education," the "no right
to public employment" approach was followed through 1952. Adler
questioned the constitutionality of the Feinberg Law8 which provided
for the removal of any teacher advocating, or belonging to any organiza-
tion which advocated, the violent overthrow of the government. Adler
claimed the law infringed upon his right of free speech and association;
however, the Supreme Court upheld the statute, stating that while
people can assemble and speak what they choose, "[i]t is equally clear
that they have no right to work for the State in the school system on their
own terms."'" In 1967 the Adler case was rejected by the Supreme
Court in Keyishian v. Board of Regents. 5 In overturning the dismissal
of faculty members who refused to sign an oath required by the Feinberg
Law," the Court rejected the theory that public employment may be
subject to any conditions regardless of how unreasonable.
The Supreme Court, in 1968, described the manner in which first
amendment rights and public employment are to be harmonized in the case
of Pickering v. Board of Education."7 Plaintiff, a teacher, was dismissed
for publishing a letter which criticized the Board of Education's alloca-
tion of funds between educational and athletic programs. In reasoning
that teachers did not relinquish all first amendment rights they would
enjoy as citizens by accepting public employment,' " the Court proposed a
balancing test:
The problem in any case is to arrive at a balance between the
interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon
10. 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892).
11. Id. at 220, 29 N.E. at 517.
12. 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
13. N.Y. Educ. Law § 3022 (McKinney 1970).
14. 342 U.S. at 492.
15. 385 U.S. 589 (1967). The Court stated that the Adler case had been overruled
by a series of cases following it. Id. at 595. However, the dissent questioned this state-
ment. Id. at 625 (dissenting opinion of Clark, J.).
16. The law required personnel (including teachers) of any state institution of
higher learning to sign the "Feinberg Certificate" declaring that the signer had never
been a member of the Communist Party or, if he had, that he had so reported to the
President of the State University. Id. at 595-96.
17. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
18. Id. at 568.
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matters of public conern and the interest of the State, as an
employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it
performs through its employees."
Ultimately, the Court held that Pickering could not be dismissed for
exercising his right to speak on issues of public importance."0 In sum-
mary, it is now recognized that the public employee, including the
policeman,21 is no longer forced to forego constitutional rights in order to
take public employment.
The court in Muller specifically held Rule 31 to be unconstitutionally
overbroad,22 reasoning that "in substance, it prohibits all criticism by
policemen of the department."2 There is little doubt that in formulating
its regulations for police officers, the Chicago Police Department may
restrict some comments, such as criticism which would have the effect
of seriously impeding the public service. Yet, the court in the instant
case established no guidelines as to the type of regulation which may be
permissible, but merely mentioned that the balance may be different in
the police context when compared to the teacher situation.24
In determining the extent to which a municipal police department
should be permitted to restrict the free speech of its members, there are
three legitimate interests to be balanced. First, there is the police depart-
19. Id.
20. Id. at 574.
21. The Supreme Court has also recognized that policemen do not necessarily
waive their constitutional rights in accepting employment. In Garrity v. New Jersey,
385 U.S. 493 (1967), policemen were compelled to answer self-incriminating questions
concerning ticket-fixing, or be subject to discharge. In holding the demand to be
unconstitutional the Court said, "We conclude that policemen, like teahcers and lawyers,
are not relegated to a watered-down version of constitutional rights." Id. at 500. The
Court's decision was not limited to unconstitutional invasion of fifth amendment rights,
but it included first amendment rights among those for the exercise of which the state
cannot exact a price.
22. The "overbreadth problem," simply stated, is that once a determination has been
made that specific actions are to be prohibitied, if the language of the rule is overbroad,
it will result in the prohibition of conduct not intended to be prohibited. The result is
that a regulation, which would otherwise be valid, is struck down as proscribing pro-
tected activity.
23. Muller at 903-04.
24. The department attempted to distinguish Pickering from the instant case on
the grounds that the police situation is more factually similar to that of the military than
to that of teachers. Muller at 904. While the need of a police department to maintain
discipline may be more closely related to military cases than to teacher cases, this in no
way discredits the balancing test proposed in Pickering. Rather, it merely alters the
relative weights which should be given the relevant interests. While the maintenance of
strong discipline may be much more important to police departments than to teachers,
this does not affect the validity of applying a balancing test. For a more complete
treatment of free speech in the military, see Sherman, The Military Courts and Service-
aen's First Amendment Rights. 22 HASTINGS L.J. 325 (1971).
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ment's interest in maintaining and improving the public service performed,
which favors the imposition of regulations restricting public statements by
police officers. Opposed to this interest are the interests of the individual
officer in being able to express his opinions as a citizen and society's
interest in maintaining the greatest possible amount of discourse on
matters of public concern.
The interest of the police department or, to state in other terms, the
interest of society in maintaining an efficient police department, can be
categorized into internal and external considerations. The internal prob-
lem is that of maintaining discipline;25 the external problem is that of
maintaining public confidence and respect."8 A police department must
maintain a certain degree of discipline over its officers if it is to maintain
the public service." Police officers must be willing to accept and execute
policy decisions and specific orders because failure to do so could lead to
a breakdown of police operations." Moreover, it is generally accepted
that in a democratic society the maintenance of the public service is
also dependent upon public cooperation, which in turn rests upon public
confidence.29 If citizens were to lose their respect for police and there-
fore withhold their voluntary cooperation, the effects on the maintenance
of the public service could be disastrous. However, some critical state-
ments may have so slight an impact upon internal discipline and external
confidence that they do not affect performance of the public service.
Regulations preventing police from making such statements are improper.
Consequently, only those rules designed to prohibit the disruption or
impairment of the public service should be permitted."
A second interest to be weighed is that of the individual policeman
in his right to voice an opinion in matters of public concern. Freedom of
expression is so fundamental that the Supreme Court has held it must be
protected even in cases where the speech is unpopular or lacks social
value."'
25. See In re Gioglio, 104 N.J. Super. 88, 96, 248 A.2d 570, 574-75 (1968).
26. Bruldewa v. Police Commissioner, 257 Md. 36, 43, 52, 263 A.2d 210, 214-15,
218 (1970).
27. See In re Gioglio, 104 N.J. Super. 88, 96, 248 A.2d 570, 574-75 (1968). Gioglio
refused to report, as ordered, to the uniformed division (rather than the detective division
as he had done previously). In addition, he complained to the press about departmental
decisions. The court held that punishment for failing to report for duty was justified
while punishment for exercising his right to free speech was not proper absent impair-
ment of the public service, which was not shown.
28. Id. at 96, 248 A.2d at 575.
29. Ours is not a police state in which police departments maintain order by sheer
force. Rather, we function with relatively few officers because the public has confidence
that the police are acting in its best interest and, therefore, lends its cooperation.
30. In re Gioglio, 104 N.J. Super. 88, 98, 248 A2d 570, 575.
31. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 444-45 (1963).
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The third interest to be weighed in the evaluation of police restric-
tions on free speech is that of society's desire to encourage the free
exchange of ideas in order to facilitate opinion formation on the individual
level and policy formation on the governmental level. 2 The dependence
upon the free exchange of ideas to facilitate policy making is especially
important with regard to those individuals having special knowledge or
experience in the area of discussion; i.e., policemen, who best know the
dealings of their own department.3" If a society limits the rights of
policemen to criticize the department, it may be eliminating its best supply
of accurate and insightful information. 4 For example, secrecy and "in
group loyalties" among police departments are often great, 5 at times
going so far as to conceal illegal activity. 6 By denying honest policemen
the right to criticize, the secrecy is institutionalized and the public loses
its key source of information and opportunity to correct the situation.
This was the effect of Rule 31 in Muller, which virtually prohibited all
statements concerning the department except those which were clearly
complimentary.
The primary example of a recent case which has applied the balancing
test in a police context is Brukiewa v. Police Commissioner." Brukiewa
was a verteran police officer who was interviewed on a city-wide tele-
vision program about a position paper issued by the policemen's union.
He severely criticized the new police commissioner and predicted that
if his practices continued, ". . . the bottom is going to fall out of this
city."38 This statement occurred at a time when ". . . unprecedented
rioting, looting, fire bombing and destructon of property"39 had just
32. This observation has been characterized as fundamental to democracy. See
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 488 (1957).
33. See Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 572 (1968).
34. One example of a situation in which policemen themselves were the only
accurate source of information vital to public police administration policy can be found
in ACLU, SECRET DETENTION 1Y THE CHIcAGO POLICE (1959). The report deals with the
illegal practice of the Chicago Police Department in holding arrested persons for long
periods of time without bringing them before a magistrate. Because the practice was
secret (and due no doubt in part to the ignorance of the arrested persons regarding their
constitutional rights), the practice was not made known to the general public for a
considerable length of time. This is but one illustration of a situation in which policemin
have special information which, if made available to the public, could have a consider-
able impact upon policy-making. However, if the individual officer is not free to
criticize the department, this information may remain unavailable to the public for a
long period of time.
35. See generally Wilson, Police Morale, Reform and Citizen Respect: The
Chicago Case, in THE POLICE: SIX SOCIOLOGIcAL. EsSAYS 137 (D. Bordua ed. 1967).
36. See note 33 supra.
37. 257 Md. 36, 263 A.2d 210 (1970).
38. Id. at 40, 263 A.2d at 212.
39. Id. at 65, 263 A.2d at 224 (dissenting opinion of Barnes, J.).
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passed and the police department's conduct was being closely scrutinized
by the public.4" Nevertheless, the court held that because the state had
failed to show that Brukiewa's statements imperiled either the discipline
or operations of the police department, the criticism was protected by the
first amendment. 1
Likewise in Muller, even if Rule 31 had not failed for overbreadth,
it is unlikely that the result would have been different under the balancing
test. According to Brukiewa, the state must show an adverse effect on
the public service. It was not shown that Muller's statements damaged
the public confidence in, or the operations of, the Chicago Police Depart-
ment. Moreover, it would have been extremely difficult for the depart-
ment to argue that Muller's statements rendered him incapable of per-
forming his functions since he was not suspended, but instead continued
in the same position with the same rank. In summary, there was no




41. Id. at 57, 263 A2d 221.
